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ABSTRACT 
The main thesis of this essay is that the practice of Socratic political speaking 
and the practice of Platonic political writing are intimately interconnected but 
distinct. To develop this position, the essay focuses on the famous passage 
from the Gorgias in which Socrates claims to be one of the few Athenians who 
attempt the political art truly and goes on to articulate the nature of his political 
practice as a way of speaking toward the best (521d6-e2). It then traces the 
ways Socrates attempts to use words to turn Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles to-
ward the best in the course of the dialogue. What emerges is a picture of a 
philosophical friendship between Gorgias and Socrates rooted in a common 
concern   for   justice.  Yet,   Socrates’ success with Gorgias is overshadowed by 
his failure to convince Polus or Callicles to allow a concern for truth, justice, 
and the good to animate the course of their lives. Even so, the political practice 
of Platonic writing is shown in the essay to be designed to awaken in us, the 
readers, precisely such a concern to live a life in which words are spoken in 
ways that uncover the truth and are directed toward the best. 
 
“For  it  is  not  possible,  or  not  easy,  to  change by words things that have from long ago taken 
hold  in  people’s  character.” 
           Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.9, 1179b17-8  
 
In a burst of thumotic energy that marks a moment of truth at the center of 
Plato’s  Gorgias, Callicles discloses the transformative power of the practice 
of Socratic philosophy. The words of Socrates move him to it; for in his 
responses to Polus, Socrates had articulated a radical understanding of hu-
man   life   in  which  “an  unjust  deed  must  not  be  hidden,  but   rather brought 
out into  the  open  in  order  that  one  might  give  justice  and  become  healthy.”1 
This provoked Callicles to ask Chaerephon if Socrates is serious or just 
playing around. And when Chaerephon invites Callicles to ask Socrates 
himself, Callicles puts words to an unsettling  truth:  “.  .  . if you are serious, 
and if the things you say happen to be true [ἀληθῆ], would not our life as 
human-beings be turned upside down [ἀνατετραμμένος] and would we not, 
as it seems, be doing all things opposite to what it is necessary to do?”2 Cal-
licles here recognizes that the things Socrates says, if true, have the power 
to transform our common life as human-beings by requiring us to act differ-
_________  
1 Plato, Platonis Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903), vol. III, 480c3-5.  
2 Gorgias 481c1-4. 
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ently.3 And even if throughout the dialogue Callicles shows himself to be 
incapable of putting words to things in ways that bring justice into the open, 
here, provoked by Socrates, Callicles is moved to speak a truth that uncov-
ers the political nature of Socratic philosophy. 
Although Callicles unwittingly articulates the deep political implications 
of the things Socrates says, he goes on to dismiss the practice of Socratic 
philosophy   as   “ridiculous,   unmanly, and something that deserves a beat-
ing.”4 In  language  borrowed  from  Euripides’  Antiope, Callicles urges Soc-
rates  to  “‘practice  the  beautiful  music of affairs [πραγμάτων]’  and  practice  
such   that   ‘you  will   seem  sensible  and   leave   these  clever   subtleties   to  oth-
ers.’”5 Callicles’ attempts to delineate a strict distinction between a philo-
sophical  life  spent  “whispering  [ψιθρίζονατα]  in  corners”  and  a  political  life  
spent  “giving  voice  [φθέγξασθαι] to that which is free and great and oppor-
tune”   leads  Socrates   finally   to  put   the  political  practice  at   the  heart  of  his  
philosophical life into words.6 This is what he says: 
I think that with few Athenians, so as not to say the only one, I attempt the po-
litical art truly [ἐπιχειρεῖν  τῇ ὡς  ἀληθῶς  πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ] and I alone of those 
now   living   do   political   things   [πράττειν   τὰ πολιτικὰ]; for it is not toward 
_________  
3 Irwin   is   certainly   correct   to   recognize   here   that   “Callicles realizes the importance of 
Socrates’  claims.” However, he goes on to emphasize only one side of the important truth to 
which  Callicles  gives  voice:  “Probably  Callicles  means  that  Socrates’  conclusions  show  that  
people’s  lives  are upside down . . . , not that his conclusions will turn their lives upside down 
. . . ” See Irwin 1979, 169. Yet, it is likely that the passage implies that the truth of the things 
Socrates says is capable both of showing  that  people’s  lives  are upside down and of turning 
those upside down lives right side up again by orienting them toward the question of justice. 
There are diagnostic and therapeutic dimensions to the truths Socrates speaks. 
4 Gorg. 485c1-2. 
5 Gorg. 486c4-6. In the Antiope Euripides is said to have depicted two brothers, Zethus, a 
herdsman, and Amphion, a musician, engaged in a discussion of their two ways of life. Ac-
cording to Dodds, Euripides used this as an opportunity to extend the question to a general 
comparison between the practical and the contemplative life. See Dodds 1959, 275-6. Pick-
ard-Cambridge offers a reconstruction of the plot in which Zethus berates his brother, Am-
phion, for being useless and effeminate as Amphion defends the pursuit of music and philos-
ophy. The discussion seems to have concluded with Amphion acquiescing to go hunting with 
Zethus. See Picard-Cambridge 1933, 107-8. For another reconstruction of the plot and specif-
ically of the section Callicles seems to draw upon, see Wecklein 1924, 58-62. 
6 Gorg. 485d9-e2. Note here that Callicles articulates these two ways of life in terms of 
different   ways   of   speaking:   the   philosopher   “whispers,”   the   politician   “gives   voice.” The 
Greek, φθέγξασθαι, points to the permeable boundary between the uttering of mere sounds 
and the sort of voicing capable of carrying meaning—it is situated at the border between the 
utterances of human and non-human animals. As will be heard, Socrates articulates his own 
political practice as a certain way of speaking, λέγειν. For a detailed discussion of how the 
boundary between human and non-human voicing is blurred in ancient Greek thinking, see 
Long 2011, 72-115. 
ATTEMPTING THE POLITICAL ART 
 
155 
[πρὸς] gratification that I speak the speeches I speak on each occasion, but to-
ward [πρὸς  τὸ βέλτιστον] the best, not toward [πρὸς] the most pleasant, and I 
am   not  willing   to   do   the   things   you   recommend,   “those   clever   subtleties,”   I  
will not have anything to say in the court of justice.7 
The words Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates here eloquently articulate 
the political nature of the practice of Socratic philosophy. But if we attend 
both to what Socrates says to Callicles in this dialogical context and to how 
Plato has him say it, we will learn not only that the political practice of So-
cratic philosophy involves a certain way of speaking, but also that Platonic 
writing itself performs a certain kind of politics. If discerning the practice of 
Socratic politics requires attending carefully to the ways Socrates speaks 
“toward   the   best,”   discerning the poetics of Platonic politics requires an 
ability to hear how the things he has his characters say in the dialogue are 
themselves   crafted   to   turn   the   attuned   reader   “toward   the  best.” Listening 
thus in a double register not only to what Socrates says to Callicles in this 
dramatic context, but also to how Plato has him say it, will uncover the 
complex and intimate interconnection between the politics of Platonic writ-
ing and that of Socratic speaking. To anticipate: Platonic writing tries to do 
with us what Socratic saying tries to do with those he encounters. The pas-
sage in which Socrates is made to articulate the nature of his political prac-
tice thus speaks on two levels. On what might be called the apophantic lev-
el, the written text shows the philosophical life to be integrated with the 
political life; on the dialogical level, the things Socrates says to Callicles 
challenge the traditional manner in which Athenian politics is practiced. An 
apophantic and dialogical double reading of this passage opens the possibil-
ity of a double reading of the Gorgias as at once depicting the practice of 
Socratic politics and performing the politics of Platonic writing. 
I. Doing Things with Words 
In one sense, it is impossible to maintain a strict distinction between what 
Socrates says and how Plato has him say it, for the Socrates we encounter in 
the  Platonic  dialogues  is,  as  Plato  himself  puts  it,  a  Socrates  “become  beau-
tiful   and   new.”8 Yet in the passage under consideration, there are three 
_________  
7 Gorg. 521d6-e2. 
8 Plato and John Burnet, Platonis Opera (New York: Oxford University Press, 1907), vol. 
V, 314c4-5. There are, obviously, other sources on which to draw for a picture of the histori-
cal Socrates. But that endeavor, undertaken by many able scholars, is beside the point made 
here which remains concerned exclusively with the difference between Plato the philosopher-
dramatist and the figure of Socrates who appears in Plato’s   philosophical   dialogues. For a 
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repetitions that suggest the manner in which Platonic writing attempts to 
turn  the  reader’s  attention toward the question of the good and heighten the 
reader’s  awareness  of  the  relationship between the way things are said and a 
concern for the best. The first and perhaps most striking instance of repeti-
tion is heard in the polyptoton of the Greek word for speaking itself, λέγειν, 
when  Socrates  says  “I  speak  the  speeches I speak on each occasion (λέγων  
τοὺς  λόγους  οὕς  λέγω  ἑκάστοτε).” The trope points to another polyptoton 
toward the very beginning of the Gorgias, in which Polus responds to 
Chaerephon’s  questions  concerning  who Gorgias is by launching into a dis-
play of words in which he repeats iterations of the Greek word for experi-
ence, ἐμπειρία:  “Many  are  the  arts  among  human-beings, Chaerephon, that 
have been discovered experientially from experience, for experience makes 
the course of life pass along the path of art, and inexperience along the path 
of   luck.”9 In speaking of the art of which Gorgias partakes, Polus shows 
himself to have a certain kind of rhetorical knack, for he has the hang of 
how to play with sounds in appealing ways.  Thus,  Plato’s  decision  to  put  
such   a   rhetorical   “jingle”   into   the  mouth   of   Socrates   as   he   articulates   his  
political art may be taken as an attempt to highlight the difference between 
how Socrates attempts to do political things with words and how political 
speech is so often designed to gratify an audience. 
Indeed, the practice of Socratic politics is characterized as a way of 
speaking oriented toward the best as opposed to the merely pleasant. This 
too is emphasized in writing by the appearance of a second trope of repeti-
tion as Socrates is made to speak the preposition πρὸς, or   ‘toward,’ three 
times. Socrates insists that he speaks  “not   toward  gratification   .   .   . but to-
ward  the  best,  not  toward  the  most  pleasant.”10 As Dodds points out, this is 
an  “a b a construction.”11 The anaphora gestures to the erotic dimension of 
political speaking and emphasizes the importance of that toward which 
one’s   speech   is directed. It   thus   points   back   to   Socrates’   response   to   that  
passage with which we began, when Callicles reinserted himself into the 
middle of the dialogue. There, Socrates suggests that he and Callicles share 
a   common   experience,   for   “we   are   two   lovers,   each   in   love   with   two  
things.”12 The distinction between the things they each love, in fact, parses 
along the line between what is most pleasant and what is best that is estab-
_________ 
compelling recent attempt to discern the historical circumstances around the trial and execu-
tion of the historical Socrates, see Brickhouse and Smith 2002. 
9  Gorg. 448c4-7. The polyptoton can be heard in the following: “Πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν  
ἀνθρπώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ  τῶν  ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι. Ἐμπερία . . .” 
10 Gorg. 521d8-e1. 
11 Dodds 1959, 369.  
12 Gorg. 481d3. 
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lished by the repetition of the πρὸς in the passage under consideration. Soc-
rates is in love with Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles with Demos, the 
son of Pyrilampes, and the Athenian demos.13 If   Socrates’   two   beloveds 
pull him often in opposite directions, the one toward pleasure, the other 
toward the best, Callicles is pulled by both of those he loves toward gratifi-
cation and the maximization of pleasure. If the words Callicles speaks in 
speaking to Socrates bespeak his erotic attraction toward what is most 
pleasant, the words Plato writes and the ways they are written call attention 
to the political implications of allowing our words to be animated by an 
erotic attraction toward gratification. 
The third repetition Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates here is the reit-
eration of words Callicles had spoken earlier as he quoted from a passage in 
Euripides’  Antiope in which Zethus enjoins his brother Amphion to give up 
the effeminate musical life and turn his attention to more practical things. 
Thus, Plato makes Socrates refuse Callicles’ advice  to  give  up  “those  fancy  
subtleties”  by  repeating  the  words  themselves. This refusal in those words 
invites  us   to  consider   the  degree   to  which  Socrates’  own  political  practice  
subverts the traditional way of understanding the distinction between the 
philosophical and the political life as separate and opposed. Taken together, 
these three instances of written tropes of rhetorical repetition point us to a 
politics capable of doing things with words when they are rooted in and 
directed toward an erotic concern for the best. The repetitions themselves 
require us, as readers, to consider the extent to which philosophy, be it spo-
ken or written, cannot be divorced from politics; for in drawing our atten-
tion to the relationship between the words we articulate and the question of 
the best, the words written by Plato invite us to reflect upon the manner in 
which we use words to do things in our lives with one another.  
But Platonic writing derives its real political power from the manner in 
which it depicts the figure of Socrates putting politics into practice in a spe-
cific way. Let us attend, then, to what Socrates says his political practice 
involves in the passage we have been considering. It begins in a quintessen-
tially Socratic manner by presenting a most serious point in playful lan-
guage.  “I  think  that  with  few  Athenians,  so  as  not  to  say  the  only  one,  I  at-
tempt the political art truly and I alone of those now living do political 
things. . . .”14 As a personal supposition rather than a simple assertion, the 
arrogance of the claim is tempered even as its effect as a critique of Atheni-
_________  
13 Demos,  the  son  of  Pyrilampes,  was  called  “beautiful”  by  Aristophanes and  “stupid” by 
Eupolis. See Nails 2002, 124. This,  of  course,  does  not  speak  well  of  Callicles’  erotic  judg-
ment, if judgment there be in such cases. 
14 Gorg. 521d6-8. 
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an politics is heightened. Socrates embraces the practice of politics here in a 
way that superficially seems to contradict a statement he had made earlier 
to  Polus  in  which  he  claimed  “I  am  not  of  the  politicians.”15 Yet here, a dif-
ferent sort of politics comes to language; for its way of doing is assaying—
this is the deep significance of the verb ἐπιχειρεῖν—to attempt, or more lit-
erally,  to  try  one’s  hand at something.16 And he goes on to lend determina-
tion   to  what   it  means   to  “attempt   the  political  art   truly”  when  he  suggests  
that it involves a way of speaking oriented not toward gratification, but to-
ward the best. 
What is thus heard in this passage is an implicit critique of a certain way 
of political speaking, a recognition that the doing of political things in-
volves a specific ability to do things with words. Socrates lends determina-
tion to the nature of this ability by calling it a πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ.17 Yet, pre-
cisely what Socrates means by emphasizing that his political ability is itself 
a  τέχνη can only be discerned by attending to the manner in which he ap-
peals to τέχνη in the course of the dialogue, where, as will be heard, it 
names a practice that is held to account   on   “each   occasion”   by   an   erotic  
relationship  “toward  the  best.” Already in the passage under consideration 
Socrates emphasizes the manner in which he attempts the political art; for 
he says he attempts the political art truly—ὡς  ἀληθῶς. The adverbial clause 
is designed to differentiate the practice of Socratic politics from the stand-
ard practice of Athenian politics. But the qualification is more than a mere 
differentiation; for the practice of Socratic politics is the attempt to speak 
truth, and in so speaking, to reveal the nature of things and to uncover the 
possibilities of community that emerge when words are oriented by a con-
cern for what is best. 
From its earliest beginnings in ancient Greek epic poetry, ἀλήθεια has 
always been intimately linked to the domain of saying.18 In Homer, the term 
appears in everyday contexts in which someone asks for a response that 
uncovers the reality of things.19 The tradition that connects truth with ways 
_________  
15 Gorg. 473e6. 
16 Irwin   is   right   to  emphasize  this  dimension  of  Socrates’  claim:  “Socrates  does  not  say 
that he has this   craft,   but   that   he   ‘undertakes’   (or   ‘attempts,’ ἐπιχειρεῖν) it, looking for its 
principles;;  and  so  this  remark  need  not  conflict  with  his  previous  disavowal  of  knowledge.”  
See Irwin 1979, 240.  
17 He  seems  to  emphasize  the  status  of  the  activity  as  a  τέχνη  insofar as calling it simply a 
πολιτική  would   have   been   sufficient   to   establish   it   as   a  kind   of   τέχνη. Lyons suggests that 
“the  form  in  –ική  may  be  used  indifferently  with  or  without  τέχνη  and  in  either  case  it  will  be  
picked up  by  τέχνη  with  equal  readiness” (Lyons 1963, 143). 
18 Boeder 1959, 94. 
19 For a detailed discussion of the history of truth in ancient Greek culture and philoso-
phy, see Long 2010, 21-48.  
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of speaking that are at once directed toward determinate individuals in con-
crete social-political contexts and concerned to uncover the nature of things 
is heard throughout the Gorgias. This is clear already in dialogue’s   first  
iteration of ἀλήθεια when  Chaerephon   poses   the   question   to  Gorgias:   “is  
Callicles here speaking the truth [ἀληθῆ λέγει], that you claim to answer 
whatever   anyone   asks   you?” To this, Gorgias responds: Ἀληθῆ (“it   is  
true”).20 This is, indeed, the first word Plato puts into the mouth of Gorgias, 
suggesting already that the question concerning the speaking of truth will be 
a matter of central importance to the discussion. This suggestion is rein-
forced by the adverbial qualification Socrates inserts into the center of his 
articulation of the political art he attempts. Perhaps, then, deeper insight 
into both the practice of Socratic politics and the politics of Platonic writing 
will be gained by following an itinerary through the Gorgias in which the 
speaking of truth is heard to   lend  determination   to   the   πολιτικὴ τέχνη   at-
tempted by Socrates and Plato both. Such an itinerary will also lend insight 
into the extent to which the true political art has the capacity, as Callicles 
had recognized, to turn our common life as human beings upside down. For 
the terms championed by each interlocutor with whom Socrates speaks in 
the Gorgias—rhetoric over dialogue, power over truth, politics over philos-
ophy—are shown to be reversed in the course of the dialogue as Socrates 
articulates an understanding of τέχνη   as   erotically   oriented   toward   the  
best.21 And  because  the  model  for  this  τέχνη  is  doctoring,  it  is  perhaps  ap-
propriate to understand this reversal in more organic language, for what the 
Gorgias shows is that rhetoric is rooted in dialogue, power in truth and poli-
tics in the practice of philosophy. 
II. Gorgias: Articulating a True Rhetoric 
What  begins  as  a  question  “concerning  the  power  that  belongs  to  the  man’s  
art,  and  what  it  is  he  proclaims  and  teaches”  quickly  becomes  an  instruction  
to  ask:  “who  is he?”22 The transition is quick: Socrates says he is interested 
in learning about the τέχνη  Gorgias  claims  to  practice  and  teach,  and  specif-
ically about its power [δύναμις]. But  when  Callicles  insists  “there  is  nothing 
like  asking  the  man  himself,”  Socrates  implicitly  refuses,  directing  Chaero-
_________  
20 Gorg. 447d7-448a1. 
21 Rocco   has   suggested   that   this   list   of   dichotomies   “remain   the   essentially   contested  
terms  in  the  agonistic  economy  of  Plato’s Gorgias.” See Rocco 1996, 363. Although the Gor-
gias remains itself agonistic to the end, there is within the agonistic context, a sort of friend-
ship that emerges between Gorgias and Socrates. 
22 Gorg. 447c-d. 
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phon to ask Gorgias who he is. The power of the art Gorgias claims to teach 
seems, thus, to be intimately related to the sort of person he is and the sorts 
of people he influences. Plato amplifies the importance of these connections 
by having the direct conversation between Gorgias and Socrates mediated 
by a display of ineptitude by their associates, each of whom shows himself 
to be incapable of dialogue.23 Once Gorgias does in fact respond directly to 
Socrates, Socrates introduces the central tension at stake in his initial dis-
cussion with Gorgias, the difference between rhetoric and dialogue.24 These 
initial  encounters,  then,  suggest  that  the  power  of  the  τέχνη  one  practices  is  
intimately bound up with the sort of person one is and that both the art one 
proclaims and teaches and the life one lives are rooted fundamentally in the 
way one does things with words.  
The conversation between Gorgias and Socrates is, in fact, marked by a 
concern not merely to identify the power of the art Gorgias claims to teach, 
but more importantly, by a concern to turn Gorgias toward the question of 
justice so as to allow this question to inform and guide his art of speaking. 
The dialogue between them is itself marked by a certain concern for justice 
that is heard in those moments of candor when Socrates reveals to Gorgias 
who he is and why he speaks the way he does. It would, indeed, be difficult 
to identify an interlocutor in the Platonic dialogues with whom Socrates 
uncovers more about his own ways of speaking than he does with Gorgias 
in the Gorgias.25 Despite the generally antagonistic atmosphere, a genuine 
friendship seems to emerge between Socrates and Gorgias, a friendship 
nourished, it seems, by mutual respect, a certain playfulness and, indeed, a 
strong commitment to candor.26 Thus, although Socrates explicitly raises 
_________  
23 Interestingly, Socrates is shown to instruct Chaerephon in the dialogue as to precisely 
how to speak, Gorgias’s  interaction  with  Polus  is  merely  to  move  him  out  of  the  way  so  that  
the λόγος might continue—Socrates is the only one in the dialogue shown actually attempting 
to teach. 
24 Gorg. 448d9. Thus, Socrates speaks the word ῥητορική for the first time in the dia-
logue, juxtaposing it explicitly with διαλέγεσθαι. This, of course, is a deepening of the initial 
dichotomy between the sort of ἐπίδειξις Gorgias has just performed and the διαλέγεσθαι Soc-
rates seeks (447b6-c4). 
25 Something analogous happens between Socrates and Protagoras in the Protagoras 
when Socrates insists that the dialogue proceed in short speeches because he wants to exam-
ine the logos well, though, as he suggests, this might also involve  an  examination  of  the  one’s  
asking and answering. See, Prot. 333c7-9 and 331c-d. For a discussion of this, see Long 
2011, 374-5n29. 
26 Weiss calls attention to the respect that seems to emerge between Socrates and Gorgias. 
See Weiss 2003, 200. Teloh sees  Gorgias  as  “arrogant,”  but  recognizes  that  Gorgias  seems  to  
“take  a  genuine  interest  in  the  remainder  of  the  conversation,”  even  facilitating  it  at  times. See 
Teloh 2007, 64. Fussi too recognizes the importance of the ongoing presence of Gorgias in 
the dialogue, but she also emphasizes that Gorgias, both as a stranger in Athens and as an 
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the question of frank speaking, or παρρησία, only in the context of his dis-
cussion with Callicles, he puts παρρησία into practice with Gorgias, uncov-
ering the true motivations behind his own ways of speaking.27 In speaking 
frankly about his own method, in attempting to articulate the sort of person 
he is, Socrates uncovers a truth about his practice of philosophy that seems 
to have been compelling enough to Gorgias that he remains an active partic-
ipant in the dialogue even after he has supposedly been shamed into defeat 
by Socrates. If, however, the political power of the words Socrates speaks 
to Gorgias is illustrated by their capacity to move Gorgias toward the best 
by  turning  his  attention  to  the  question  of  justice,  Gorgias’s  continuing  par-
ticipation at decisive moments in the dialogue shows the degree to which 
the poetics of Platonic politics is concerned to demonstrate the power of a 
rhetoric rooted in the pursuit of truth.28 By tracing those moments of candor 
_________ 
orator selling his rhetoric, cannot be as candid as Socrates. See Fussi 2001, 125 and 144. The 
element of play can be heard at 449d5-7 when Socrates and Gorgias agree with Gorgias is 
doing an admirable job giving short answers. 
27 Monoson  points  to  the  six  appearances  of  the  term  ‘παρρησία’  in  the  dialogue—487a3, 
487b1, 47d5, 491e7-8, 492d2, 521a6—all of which occur in the discussion between Socrates 
and Callicles. See Monoson 2000, 162. Given the extent to which παρρησία  was one of the 
core values affirmed and cultivated by the Athenian citizenry, it is no surprise that the issue 
emerges explicitly as a theme in the context of a discussion between two Athenians. Socrates 
himself suggests that παρρησία would   have   been   cultivated   in  Callicles,   him   “having   been  
educated sufficiently, at least as many Athenians would assert . . .”  (487b6-7). Socrates here 
implies his own disagreement with what many Athenians consider to be a good education. 
That Callicles shows himself to be incapable of frank speech further reinforces the irony of 
Socrates’  praise  of  Callicles  for  παρρησία. For a discussion of the extent to which παρρησία 
was a deeply held value of the Athenian democracy, see Saxonhouse 2006, 85-126. The ques-
tion of whether Socrates is being frank when, at Gorg. 486e6-488b1, he calls Callicles a 
touchstone of the adequacy of the truth concerning the things his soul believes is a matter of 
some debate. There Socrates suggests Callicles has knowledge, goodwill and frankness, 
which makes him an ideal interlocutor for Socrates. The case against taking Socrates at his 
word with regard to knowledge and goodwill seems fairly straightforward as Callicles shows 
himself in the dialogue neither to possess knowledge nor to have good will toward Socrates. 
McKim  makes  the  compelling  argument  that  Socrates  “is  being  just  as  ironical  about  frank-
ness as he is about knowledge and goodwill” (McKim 1988, 40). Teloh  agrees  that  Socrates’  
praise of Callicles here is ironic (Teloh 2007, 68). Dodds offers a different view, seeing Calli-
cles as caring   sincerely   for  Socrates   and  hearing  Socrates’  praise  of  Callicles’   frankness  as  
genuine. See Dodds 1959, 14 and 263. Even if we take Socrates as being ironic about Calli-
cles’   specific   characteristics,   it   is   nevertheless   possible   to   take   Socrates   seriously  when   he  
insists  that  their  agreement  would  be  “the  complete  truth.”  See,  Gorg. 487e7. 
28 Stauffer   has   emphasized   that   Gorgias’s continuing interventions in the dialogue are 
signs  that  “Socrates  has  succeeded  in  capturing  his  interest”  and  even  that  Gorgias  has  learned  
the importance of turning toward justice. See Stauffer 2006, 120-1. Kastely argues convinc-
ingly that Gorgias is more than a mere foil for Socrates, but is, in fact, an example of a rhetor-
ician  who   understands   his   art   as   “existing   for   the   benefit   of   the   community.” See Kastely 
1991, 99-100. Plato’s  writing  reinforces  the  importance  of  this  commitment  to  community by 
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in which Socrates articulates why he speaks to Gorgias the way he does, we 
will begin to discern the deep connection in speaking truth and practicing 
the political art. By attending to the continuing presence of Gorgias in the 
dialogue, we will hear something of the true political art of Platonic writing. 
III. Speaking Truth with Gorgias 
There  are  two  moments  of  candor  in  Socrates’  dialogue  with  Gorgias  wor-
thy of attention in this context. The first is heard after Gorgias is led to 
agree  that  rhetoric  is  an  art  that,  as  Socrates  says,  “brings  about  and  accom-
plishes everything  by  means  of  words.”29 But when asked about the nature 
of  these  things  rhetoric  does  with  words,  Gorgias  insists  that  they  are  “the  
greatest of human concerns,  Socrates,   and   the  best.”30 Socrates then seeks 
clarity on precisely what these greatest and best things, in fact, are,         
although  after  they  agree  that  “rhetoric  is  a  producer  of  persuasion,”  Socra-
tes admits that he has a suspicion about the things with which rhetoric is 
concerned.31 Here, however, Socrates inserts into the discussion an account 
of the sort of person he is as a way of revealing to Gorgias the reason why 
he continues to ask him about the things with which rhetoric is concerned 
rather than asserting his own suspicions straight away. “Listen,  Gorgias,”  
Socrates begins and in so beginning calls attention to the need to pay atten-
tion,  “know  well  that  I  am  one  of  those,  as  I  persuade  myself,  who,  if  some-
one engages with another in dialogue, wants to know the very thing con-
cerning which the λόγος exists. And I consider you to be such a person 
too.”32 The gesture to persuasion as what offers Socrates insight into the 
sort person he is, at once amplifies the connection between Gorgias and 
Socrates—for here they are said to be the same—and suggests that there is 
an element of suasion endemic to dialogue itself. Indeed, the desire to know 
the very thing about which they speak seems to animate their engagement 
with one another—or so Socrates hopes to persuade Gorgias. By revealing 
the sort of person he is, Socrates attempts to cultivate in Gorgias a shared 
desire to know the thing itself. Thus, he continues by emphasizing what 
_________ 
having Gorgias intervene at moments when the community of dialogue threatens to break 
down. 
29 Gorg. 451d2-3. 
30 Gorg. 451d7-8. 
31 Gorg. 453a2-c1. 
32 Gorg. 453a8-b3. The anacoluthon makes the passage difficult to get into English with 
sufficient nuance to capture the urgent manner in which Socrates reveals something decisive 
about himself in order to establish a deeper connection with Gorgias. Despite this difficulty, 
Dodds  says  this  is  “a  natural  and  fairly  common  type  of  anacoluthon.” See Dodds 1959, 203.  
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motivates his desire to proceed by questioning rather than asserting his own 
suspicions:  “It   is  not  for  your  sake,  but  for   the  sake  of  the  λόγος, in order 
that it might proceed forward in a way that makes what we are saying as 
evident [καταφανὲς]  to  us  as  possible.”33 This process of questioning, how-
ever, cannot be construed to mean that Socrates is unconcerned with Gorgi-
as as a person. To the contrary, that Gorgias is someone who wants to un-
cover the very thing about which they are speaking is the condition under 
which their dialogue proceeds. Strangely enough, however, Socrates con-
ceals his suspicions momentarily in order to try to move Gorgias to become 
the sort of person Socrates says he considers him to be, namely, one who 
himself   “wants   to   know   the   very   thing   concerning  which   their   λόγος ex-
ists.”  
Once Socrates leads Gorgias to articulate what Socrates had himself sus-
pected—that rhetoric concerns the sort of persuasion that goes on in law 
courts and in crowds—there appears another moment of candor, prompted 
again by the hyperbolic praise Gorgias has for the power of rhetoric. “It  
holds all powers together  within  itself,”  says  Gorgias  as  he  launches  into  the  
famous story of how his brother, the doctor, is powerless without rhetoric if 
he is unable to persuade his patient to drink his medicine or submit to burn-
ing.34 In this speech, however, Gorgias also evokes the example of the 
skilled  boxer  who  must  learn  how  to  use  the  skill  “in  a  just  manner.”35 By 
introducing the question of the just use of power here, Gorgias shows him-
self to be, like Socrates, concerned with justice, which, it seems, is the very 
thing concerning which their speech exists. 
Recognizing the emergence of a shared erotic interest in the just, Socrates 
seeks to deepen the level of their connection. He begins by appealing to an 
experience he and Gorgias must share in discussions such as these when 
people  allow  the  “desire  to  win”  to  distort  their  inquiry  into  “that  which  lies  
there  before  them  in  their  speech.”36 He  goes  on  to  say:  “I  fear   in  my  dia-
logue with you, that you might take me to be speaking from a desire to win 
against you rather than for the matter at hand [τὸ πρᾶγμα] to become evi-
dent [καταφανὲς  γενέσθαι].”37 Here, Socrates uses words not only to deepen 
his relationship with Gorgias by uncovering what motivates the things he 
says, but also to direct their shared attention toward the attempt to use 
words in such a way that the nature of the matter at hand becomes evident. 
Thus, Socrates speaks truth as ἀλήθεια  with  Gorgias  in  a  rich  double  sense,  
_________  
33 Gorg. 453c2-4. Cf., Protagoras, 331c-d, 333c7-9 and n25, above. 
34 Gorg. 456a7-457c3. 
35 Gorg. 456e3:  “ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως.” 
36 Gorg. 457c4-d5. 
37 Gorg. 457e3-5. 
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for his words uncover a common bond between them, affirming their shared 
concern for justice, even as they also reveal the degree to which this shared 
matter of concern will only become evident if they are able to speak togeth-
er in ways that articulate its nature. Speaking truth is heard here to be capa-
ble at once of opening a space of community and of uncovering the nature 
of things. For this reason, Socrates seeks to root his relationship with Gor-
gias in a shared loyalty toward the truth, suggesting that they ought not to 
continue if Gorgias is not the same sort of person he is. Socrates puts it this 
way:  “And  what  sort  of  person  am  I? The sort for whom it is a pleasure to 
be refuted, if I say something that is not true, but who is pleased to refute if 
someone should say something that is not true, and no more displeased to 
be  refuted  than  to  refute.”38 Gorgias responds by affirming that he himself 
is just such a person, and in the course of the rest of the dialogue, he shows 
himself increasingly to be one who uses words to nourish the community of 
dialogue and to make what they are saying as evident as possible. 
These two moments of truth cultivate in Gorgias a desire for truth that 
becomes manifest the moment he recognizes that if a person comes to him 
not knowing what is just and unjust, good and bad, beautiful and shameful, 
these things will need to be learned as part of the art of rhetoric itself. Gor-
gias  is  moved  to  this  recognition  by  Socrates’  attempts  to  speak  the  truth  to  
and with him. Thus, his dialogue with Gorgias must be heard as politics in 
practice, for Socrates speaks toward the best: he uses words to turn        
Gorgias’s  attention toward the question of the just in such a way that it is 
felt to inform not only what he teaches, but who he is. The art of rhetoric is 
here shown to be rooted in true dialogue. If, however, the power of Socratic 
politics is felt in the dialogue of truth that emerges between Gorgias and 
Socrates, the nature of the relationship between truth and power comes ex-
plicitly to language in the discussion with Polus, but only because Gorgias 
is willing to use words of his own to move the discussion in that direction. 
IV. Polus: Turning Toward the Best 
Polus breaks into the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias in order to 
insist that Gorgias was shamed [ᾐσχύνθη] into conceding something he 
himself  did  not  believe,  for,  as  Polus  puts  it:  “who  do  you  think  would  ut-
terly deny either that he knew what is just or that he could teach it to oth-
ers? It is totally provincial [πολλὴ ἀγροικία]   to   lead   the   λόγος   to   such 
_________  
38 Gorg. 458a2-5. 
ATTEMPTING THE POLITICAL ART 
 
165 
things.”39 For all his bravado, Polus speaks the truth here in two respects. 
First, even if he rejects its plausibility, Polus beautifully articulates precise-
ly what Socrates says about himself; for Socrates is just such a one to deny 
that he knows the just things, and that he teaches them to others.40 Second, 
even if he finds what Socrates does provincial, Polus speaks well when he 
says   that   Socrates   “leads   the   λόγος”   in   a   specific   direction;;   for   Socrates  
leads  the  λόγος  precisely  toward  just  things. Indeed, the power of speaking 
the truth we have been tracing in the dialogue lies in its ability to move oth-
ers toward justice by means of words; but this involves cultivating in them a 
knowledge of their own ignorance of just things, and a desire to know them. 
The interruption  of  Polus  threatens  to  derail  the  λόγος  from  its  path  of  truth.  
Thus, when Polus finds himself at a loss about what Socrates is saying, 
Socrates   attempts   to   return   the   λόγος   to   the   truth.   “Perhaps   speaking   the  
truth would be rather provincial [ἀγροικότερον],”41 he says, evoking the 
original insult by which Polus had interrupted his dialogue with Gorgias. 
Socrates then goes on to suggest that he hesitates, however, to speak the 
truth lest Gorgias imagines that he is satirizing his business.42 Still, Socrates 
insists,  “nothing  became  evident   to  us   [ἡμῖν  καταφανὲς  ἐγένετο] from our 
recent   λόγος   about  what   he   thinks   it   is.”43 Here again, the connection be-
tween  speaking  the  truth  and  allowing  the  matter  of   their  dialogue  to  “be-
come  evident”  is  emphasized. Now for a third time, Socrates has sought to 
redirect the conversation toward the question of justice and the best by ap-
pealing to the importance of allowing the matter at hand to become 
καταφανές—evident.44 The  adjective  is  derived  from  the  verb  ‘καταφαίνω’  
which  means  “to  declare”  or  to  make  clear  by  words.45 Each time it appears 
_________  
39 Gorg. 461c2-3. The   translation   of   “provincial”   here   does   not,   perhaps,   capture   the  
rudeness  of  Polus’s  insult.  Arieti  and  Barrus  translate  it  as  “redneck”  in  order  to  underscore  
the manner in which ἄγροικος “derives   from   a   word   for   the   rural   countryside   and   carries  
connotations of roughness  and  boorishness.” See Arieti and Barrus 2007, 49n39.  
40 Regarding knowledge, see Apology 21d-e;;  regarding  never  being  anyone’s  teacher,  see  
Ap. 33a-b. 
41 Gorg. 462e6.  
42 Arieti  and  Barrus  are  right  to  suggest  that  the  echo  of  Polus’s  use  of  the  term  ἄγροικος 
indicates that Socrates is being sarcastic. See Arieti and Barrus 2007, 51n42. The sarcasm is 
directed at Polus and designed to reorient the encounter between them toward the truth. Soc-
rates’  professed  concern  for  the  feelings  of  Gorgias  is  perhaps more genuine, for Socrates has 
shown himself, like a good host, to be concerned with the feelings of his guest. Together, the 
repetition  of  Polus’s  original insult and the gesture of guest friendship toward Gorgias show 
Socrates to be rather urbane. 
43 Gorg. 463a1-2. 
44 The word καταφανές appears three times in the dialogue, 453c4, 457e5 and here at 
463a2. 
45 Καταφαίνω, v. Liddell and Scott 1968.  
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in the dialogue, Socrates is attempting to turn the discussion toward the 
question of justice and the best and to avoid the impression that the things 
being said are intended to put Gorgias to shame. And each time it is spoken, 
Gorgias responds by urging Socrates to continue, just as he does here, when 
he re-enters  the  dialogue,  insisting  that  Socrates  “speak,  and  have  no  shame  
on  my  account.”46  
Socrates may thus be heard to practice a declarative politics in which 
words are used to allow the matter at hand to become evident and new 
communities of relation are opened by what is thus made clear. In this con-
text, the attempt to make the nature of the power of rhetoric evident in-
volves articulating an elaborate analogy between the care of the soul and 
that of the body in which two arts [τέχναι] concerning each are set against 
two experiences [ἐμπειρίαι] in order to reveal the degree to which the way 
Polus does things with words is perverted by an unhealthy conception of 
power. However, the difference between the reality of health and its ap-
pearance is established in dialogue, not with Polus, but with Gorgias, who 
affirms  the  distinction  by  telling  Socrates:  “you  speak  the  truth.”47 The truth 
Socrates speaks here both articulates the difference between the art and the 
experience of politics and uncovers two dimensions of what Socrates later 
calls his own political τέχνη.48 
The first difference Socrates articulates between the art and the experi-
ence of politics involves the end toward which it is directed. As arts, poli-
tics and the care of the body “attend  always toward the best [ἀεὶ πρὸς   τὸ 
βέλτιστον].”49 The words here anticipate those Socrates will use to describe 
his own practice of politics  as  a  τέχνη, which involves saying things, as we 
have heard, always πρὸς  τὸ βέλτιστον—toward the best. Socrates however 
brings the significance of this formulation into focus by juxtaposing it ex-
plicitly with a way of speaking he characterizes as mere pandering. In so 
doing, Socrates directs his own attention to Polus rather than Gorgias. This 
is what he says:  
I call this pandering and I say it is shameful, Polus—for this I am saying to-
ward you—because it aims at pleasure without what is best. And I say it is not 
_________  
46 Gorg. 463a5. 
47 Gorg. 464a5-6. 
48 The analogy, elaborate and complex, begins at 464b2, with Socrates calling them to 
“come  along  and,  if I  have  the  power,  I  will  display  for  you  more  clearly  what  I  am  saying.” 
Socrates’  ability,  δύναμαι, to make things clear with words is both the beginning and a main 
theme of the speech laying out the difference between the art of and the knack for politics. 
Kahn  recognizes  this  speech  as  the  beginning  of  “the  positive  exposition of this conception of 
politics”  as  a  τέχνη  which  is  “spread  throughout  the  dialogue.” See Kahn 1983, 101. 
49 Gorg. 464c4. 
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a τέχνη, but an experience, for it has no λόγος at all about the nature of the 
things it brings about or bears upon—whatever they may be; and thus, it has no 
ability to say what is responsible [τὴν   αἰτίαν] for each. I   don’t   call   a   thing  
without logos [ἄλογον] a  τέχνη.50 
This   passage   has   been   taken   to   establish   “rationality”   as   a   condition   for  
calling something an art.51 But that translation fails to capture the rich sig-
nificance of the λόγος Socrates seeks to clarify by putting into practice. For 
Socrates,   a   τέχνη   is   able   to   give   an   account   of   the   nature   of   the   things   it  
brings about and bears upon, an account Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles show 
themselves to be incapable of articulating. To  be  without  λόγος  is  to  be  un-
able to say what is responsible for each of the things the art is undertaken to 
accomplish or affect. By explicitly directing his words to Polus as he estab-
lishes the difference between the art of politics and pandering, Socrates at-
tempts not only to speak the truth about politics as a way of speaking to-
ward the best, but also to use words to turn Polus toward the best by hold-
ing him accountable to the nature of the things he does with words. 
This question of accountability bears upon the intimate connection be-
tween speaking the truth and power, a connection Polus is unable to recog-
nize because his conception of power is perverted. For  Polus,  power  is  “the  
ability   to   do   in   the   city   whatever   seems   best   for   oneself.”52 Socrates re-
sponds to this understanding of power by introducing a distinction between 
“doing  what  one  wants”  and  “doing  what  seems  best”  that  forces  Polus  to  
attend to the question of the best and the deep connection humans have to 
it.53 In changing the way they speak about power, Socrates attempts to 
change the way they seek power through speaking. For   Socrates,   “doing  
_________  
50 Gorg. 464e2-465a6. 
51 Gould identifies three characteristics   of   a   τέχνη,   it   should   involve   a   “rational   proce-
dure”   and   have   “comparative   rarity   and   dependability.” See Gould 1972, 34. Irwin argues 
that, because crafts are rational, teachable, and involve clearly delineated objective methods 
for settling questions,  Socrates  “has  good  reasons for thinking that real virtue . . . will be a 
craft. . . .” (Irwin 1979, 73-5). Nussbaum  has  been  highly  critical  of  this  view  of  τέχνη,  be-
cause it lends itself to an instrumental view of ethical deliberation. See Nussbaum 1986, 97-8. 
This, however, is only one of the limitations of the view, for the deeper issue is that it reduces 
the   rich  complexity   of   the  Greek   λόγος to only one of its meanings and imports a modern 
understanding of rationality into an ancient idea that is rooted in our deepest encounters with 
things. The far better approach is to determine the meaning of ἄλογον by attending to the way 
Socrates  appeals  to  the  λόγος  in  relation  to  it. Roochnik, who agrees with Nussbaum against 
Irwin and Gould, approaches the question  of  τέχνη  in  Plato  much  in  the  spirit  of  the  present  
essay, by attending to how the term appears in the dialogues. See Roochnik 1996, 5. 
52 Gorg. 469c5-6. 
53 Socrates establishes the distinction  between   “doing  what   they  want   (ποιεῖν  ὧν  βούλ-
ονται)” and “doing  what  seems  best  to  them  (ποιεῖν . . . ὅτι  ἂν  αὐτοῖς  δόξῃ βέλτιστον  εἶναι)”  
at 466d8-e2. 
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what  one  wants”   is   identified  with   just  actions   that  are  good  for   the  com-
munity  and  thus  for  the  individual,  while  “doing  what  seems  best  to  one”  is  
associated with the arbitrary freedom of the tyrant. Socrates insists that in 
making this distinction, he is speaking the truth.54 Attempting to refute him, 
Polus introduces the example of the alleged happiness of Archelaus, tyrant 
of Macedonia, who perpetrates many injustices, doing what seems best to 
him. When Polus suggests that Socrates would probably also claim not to 
know  if  the  Great  King  of  Persia  is  happy,  Socrates  responds,  saying:  “And  
I would be saying the truth [Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε  ἐρῶ], for I do not know how he is 
with respect to education and justice [παιδείας   ὅπως   ἔχει   καὶ 
δικαιοσύνης].”55 As directed to Polus, these words are designed to reinforce 
Socrates’  claim  to  truth  and  undermine  Polus’s  suggestion earlier that even 
a child could refute the truth of the things Socrates says. They also make the 
question of happiness one of education and justice, both of which turn out 
to  be  central  to  Socrates’  understanding  of  the  political  art  as  a  practice  of  
speaking the truth. 
The politics of truth is not simply a matter of speaking toward the best, 
but is also concerned with moving the determinate individual with whom it 
is engaged in dialogue to consider the question of justice. Thus, in his dis-
cussion with Polus, Socrates claims truth as his birthright, insisting that it 
requires the witness not of many but of one.56 He puts it this way:  “If  I  do  
_________  
54 Socrates insists that he speaks the truth at Gorg. 468c7-8 and 468e3, Polus contests it at 
470c4-5.  
55 Gorg. 470e6-7. If we attend to the way Plato writes what Socrates says here, we gain 
insight into a dimension of Platonic politics as well, for the formulation—Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε  
ἐρῶ—is morphologically ambiguous. The word ἐρῶ can be read, as it is translated here, as the 
first person present subjunctive active of εἰρέω,  which  means  ‘to  say.’ But morphologically, 
ἐρῶ can  also  be   the   first  person  subjunctive  present  of   ‘ἐράω,’ which  means  ‘to   love,’ thus 
making  the  phrase  read:  “And  I  would  be  loving  the  truth.” While this would be a plausible 
translation of the phrase even in this context, the formulation as written could be read in yet a 
more striking way; for if we take ἐρῶ as a second person singular present imperative middle-
passive of ἐράω, we would need to hear it as enjoining the  individual  reader  to:  “Love  truth!” 
Such a translation would not fit well into the present context, but what shows itself in the 
writing—namely, the injunction to love truth and to understand this love as bound up with the 
question of a good education and a concern for justice—says something decisive the politics 
of Platonic writing. If Socrates uses words to move Polus to a deeper understanding of the 
power of words rooted in a concern for justice, Plato writes in such a way to move us similar-
ly. 
56 Gorg. 472b4-c1. Indeed, Socrates enjoins:  “don’t  try  to  separate  me  from  my  very  be-
ing and the truth [ἐκβάλλειν  με  ἐκ  τῆς  οὐσίας  καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς].” Dodds recognizes that the 
addition of καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς is epexegetical,  thus,  “added  to  explain  the  metaphorical  use  of 
τῆς  οὐσίας.” While he is likely correct to suggest that this term is to be taken in the sense of 
one’s  material   inheritance,   its  meaning  remains  saturated  with   the  more  philosophical  sense  
of “substance, or being.” Thus, Dodds underestimates what is at stake in the Gorgias when he 
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not bring you yourself forward as one witness to agree with the things con-
cerning which I speak, I think that I have accomplished nothing worth 
speaking  about  concerning  the  things  of  which  our  λόγος  is  about.”57 Socra-
tes reinforces this a moment later when he claims not to be a politician in 
the traditional sense precisely because he only knows how to bring forth a 
witness  of  one,  namely,  as  he  says:  “the  very  one  toward  whom  there  is  a  
λόγος   for  me.”58 By formulating it this way, Socrates emphasizes that the 
λόγος   exists   for   him   as directed toward the one with whom he speaks. 
Thus, the politics of truth speaks in two directions. It speaks at once toward 
the best and yet also toward the one with whom it is engaged. To do this 
well, however, as Socrates does, one must remain attuned always at once to 
the question of the best and to the determinate individual with whom one is 
speaking. Thus, in attempting to turn Polus toward the just, Socrates ap-
peals to provocative examples that challenge the way Polus understands the 
nature of power. First, in order to uncover the truth that force is not power, 
Socrates offers the example of a dagger brandished in the crowded market-
place,  which  is  said  to  be  “a  wonderful  piece  of  tyrannical  power  [δύναμις  
τις  καὶ τυραννὶς]”  that  would  allow  him  to  do  whatever  seems  best  to  him.59 
Second, however, Socrates provocatively turns the values Polus embraces 
on their head, advocating that if we truly want to harm our enemies, we 
should contrive a way for them to escape and not pay a just penalty.60    
Although the things Socrates says here are directed toward Polus, and to-
ward the best, they are, as we have heard, more effective in moving Calli-
cles into the dialogue than they are in moving Polus to consider more deep-
ly how his own words relate or fail to relate to the best. Nevertheless, a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between truth and power has been 
gained in dialogue with Polus, for power is now understood to be rooted in 
an ability to speak truth both toward the best and toward the one with whom 
one is engaged. 
_________ 
insists: “Polus might rob Socrates of a true opinion, but could hardly rob him of his substan-
tial existence.” See Dodds 1959, 245. That  Socrates’  substantial  existence  is  at  stake  is  made  
clear by the appeal, in the present context, to what the many Athenians will think if he brings 
witnesses against him (472a2-5) and, in the discussion with Callicles, when the possible trial 
and execution of Socrates is explicitly evoked (486a7-d1; 521b4-d4). 
57 Gorg. 472b6-c1. 
58 Gorg. 474a6. 
59 Gorg. 469d1-e8. Jaeger is right to insist that Socrates takes the notion of power as the 
ability to do what one wants and transforms it. See Jaeger 1943, 134. If the idea of power 
Polus embraces may be called force, then Socrates might be said to advocate for a conception 
of power as the ability, cultivated by good education and a concern for justice, to use words to 
turn the community toward the best. 
60 Gorg. 480e5-b5. 
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V. Callicles: Attempting a True Politics 
Moved  by  these  Socratic  provocations,  Callicles  attacks  Socrates  as  a  “true  
demagogue”  who,  while  “claiming  to  pursue  truth,”  in  fact  engages  in  “dis-
gusting  demagoguery.”61 Again, the dialogue is animated by the contested 
question of truth, which here leads Callicles to accuse Socrates of decep-
tively playing with the distinction between nature and law, φύσις   and 
νόμος,  “working  wickedness  with  words,”  as  he  puts  it.62 With these words, 
Callicles has indeed touched the root of the Socratic practice of politics, for 
in attempting to move people by speaking truth, Socrates does not respect 
the manner in which Callicles understands the relationship between φύσις 
and νόμος.63 For Callicles, the use of force is by nature just; it is, indeed, 
the  very  “law  of  nature,  though  perhaps  not  in  accord  with  the  one  we  our-
selves  make.”64 For Socrates, as we have heard, true power is not a matter 
of moving others by force, but an ability to speak toward the best. Thus, 
although Socrates never explicitly inverts Callicles’ bold formulation about 
the  “law  of  nature,”  his  suggestion  that  is  it  not  only  by  convention  that  do-
ing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, but also by nature, implies 
that it might be necessary to think more deeply about the nature of law. In-
deed, Socrates claims that Callicles is likely not to have been speaking the 
truth when he set up the opposition  between  φύσις  and  νόμος,  for  there  is  a  
sense  in  which  νόμος  itself  grows  out  of  a  natural  attempt  to  articulate  the  
truth of things.65 But it is not that human conventions simply express the 
nature of things straightaway; rather, they are rooted in an originary experi-
ence with things that is capable of moving humans together in healthy ways 
if the words we speak to and with one another are animated by a concern to 
_________  
61 Gorg. 482a5, 482c5 and e3-5. 
62 Gorg. 483a2-3. 
63 Saxonhouse recognizes that Socrates does shift back and forth between φύσις and 
νόμος, pointing to 474c and 478a, b and d. See Saxonhouse 1983, 147-48. She recognizes that 
Callicles is attempting to “unite  the  two  concepts  in  a  startling  new  phrase  ‘the  law  of  nature’  
(nomos tes physeos, 483e), a law of inequality supported by nature herself, as seen among 
animals and most significantly among nations where the question of right (dike) is only spo-
ken of, but not followed.” Fussi understands how the distinction between φύσις and νόμος is 
used in the dialogue to give rise to the opposition between philosophy and politics. See Fussi, 
1996, 119. As we will hear, however, Socrates attempts to blur the difference because he 
wants to root politics in philosophy. Jaeger ascribes to Plato a position we hear Socrates seek-
ing to establish in his discussion with Callicles: Plato “did not think of nature (as the sophistic 
teachers did) as raw material out of which education was to form a work of art; he thought it 
was the highest areté, which is only incompletely manifested in individual man.” See Jaeger 
1943, 134. 
64 Gorg. 483e1-4. 
65 Gorg. 489a8-b6. 
ATTEMPTING THE POLITICAL ART 
 
171 
uncover the truth. Callicles himself lays claim to a different truth: that ex-
cellence and  happiness  are  “luxury,  licentiousness, and freedom, if [each] is 
held  with  mercenary   force.”66 All conventions contrary to this natural law 
of force are, according to Callicles, worthless. And even when Socrates 
leads Callicles through the implications of this  alleged  “truth”—a journey 
that ends at the life of a catamite—Callicles cannot proceed, for he shows 
himself to have no relationship with the truth, no ability to be moved by 
anything other than a desire for gratification and no ideal toward which his 
words might be held accountable. 67 
In order to hold this account itself accountable to something beyond mere 
gratification,  Socrates  directs  Callicles  to  attend  to  “that  concerning  which  
these λόγοι  exist  for  us,”  which  he  identifies  as “the  way  it  is  necessary  for  
one to live, whether it be the life to which you call me, doing the things of a 
real man, speaking to the populace and training in rhetoric and being politi-
cal in the way you people engage in politics nowadays, or if it is this life in 
philosophy,   and  whatever   it   is   about   this   life   that   differs   from   that.”68 To 
delineate this life from that, Socrates returns to the analogy between the 
care of the soul and the care of the body he had established with Gorgias in 
the discussion with Polus.69 In so doing, Socrates lends further determina-
tion to the meaning of his own πολιτικὴ τέχνη. The difference between the 
practice of popular politics and the life of philosophy is articulated in terms 
of the difference between the knack for cooking tasty foods and the art of 
doctoring. Here again Socrates emphasizes that doctoring is an art precisely 
because  it  “looks  to  the  nature  of  the  one  upon  whom  it  attends,  acts  from  
what  is  responsible  and  has  a  λόγος  to  give  about  these  things.”70 Socrates 
goes  on  to  suggest  that  there  is  a  similar  art  concerning  the  soul,  which  “al-
so has some forethought [προμήθεια] concerning what is best for the 
_________  
66 Gorg. 492c3-6. 
67 For the catamite, see, Gorg. 494e4. Callicles himself insists that his continuing in dis-
cussion with Socrates is due simply to a desire “to gratify Gorgias here” (501c7-8). Buzzetti 
claims that Callicles does not have the ability to recognize that justice places demands upon 
us. See Buzzetti 2005, 26-7. Tarnopolsky argues that it is ultimately the catamite example that 
succeeds in shaming Callicles. See Tarnopolsky 2010, 81. Teloh calls it a “shocking attempt 
at coercive persuasion” (Teloh 2007, 68). As we have suggested, Socrates had managed to 
move Callicles to engage him in discussion by provoking Polus. Here, however, Callicles 
shows himself capable of moving only so far. He is provoked to speak by the desire to shame 
Socrates, and, presumably, the pleasure he believed he himself would gain in the process. 
Now, when he is invited to allow the desire for truth to orient his engagement with others, he 
becomes recalcitrant. 
68 Gorg. 500c1-8. 
69 See, Gorg. 464b2-466a3, and p. 166 above. 
70 Gorg. 501a1-3. 
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soul.”71 Thus, in wrapping the political activity he claims to practice in the 
mantle  of  a  τέχνη, Socrates seems to embrace three abilities at once: first, 
the ability to look into the nature of the one with whom one is engaged; se-
cond, the ability to act rooted in an understanding of what is responsible 
for the present condition of the one for whom one cares; and third, the abil-
ity to thoughtfully anticipate what is best for the soul of the one for whom 
one is concerned. These three abilities are intimately bound up with the 
ability   “to   give   a   λόγος   concerning   these   things,”   a   λόγος   we   have   now  
heard to be rooted in the attempt to speak truth with an eye toward justice. 
This way of speaking might, indeed, be called a certain kind of rhetoric, and 
Socrates goes so far as to say that such a rhetoric  would   be   “a   beautiful  
thing, preparing the souls of the citizens such that they will be the best pos-
sible, and striving earnestly to say the best things, whether they are pleasing 
or  more   unpleasant   to   those   listening.”72 These words lend depth and de-
termination  to  Socrates’  articulation of his own political practice as a τέχνη. 
Indeed,   Socrates   has   been   practicing   this   τέχνη with Gorgias, Polus, and 
Callicles all along; for the things Socrates says demonstrate that he has dis-
cerned the nature of the soul of each, that he understands what is responsi-
ble for their present conditions, and that he has an anticipatory understand-
ing of what is best for them.  
The analogy with the art of doctoring that runs through and connects Soc-
rates’  discussion  with  his  three  listeners  in  the  Gorgias, further enriches the 
manner in which Socratic politics must be understood as an art of speaking. 
Appealing  to  the  way  the  word  “healthy”  points  to  the  ordered  arrangement  
of   the  body   from  which   “health”   comes   to  be  present   in   bodies,  Socrates  
suggests that  there  is  a  certain  “law,”  or  νόμος, an ordered arrangement of 
the  soul  from  which  the  soul  too  becomes,  “law-abiding,”  νόμιμον—that is, 
healthy. Justice and temperance are two such laws.73 The return to the ques-
tion of the law here suggests the degree to which the law itself is rooted in 
the natural operations of the soul. Socrates implies by this a reversal of Cal-
licles’ “law   of   nature,”   suggesting   that   the   nature   of   law   is   to   ensure the 
healthy life of the community. This is brought about, however, only by 
ways   of   speaking   that   are   “artful   and   good.” The one who practices the 
beautiful rhetoric of philosophical politics, then, will be one who looks to-
ward justice and temperance, as the doctor looks toward the healthy order-
_________  
71 Gorg. 501b2-5. 
72 Gorg. 503a7-9. Just prior to this, Socrates had spoken of this beautiful rhetoric as “al-
ways speaking towards the best,” a formulation that echoes the things Socrates said about 
politics as the care of the soul at 464c4 and anticipates the formulation by which he articulates 
his own political art as a ways of speaking towards the best at 521d6-e2. 
73 Gorg. 504c7-d3. 
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ings of the body, and as Socrates emphasizes,  he  “will  bring  them to bear 
on  our  souls  in  speaking  speeches  and  in  all  actions.”74 This articulates well 
what  it  means  to  “attempt  the  political  art  truly,”  which  Socrates claims is 
the way he is one of few now living who does political things. Politics is 
thus heard to be rooted in philosophy. 
VI. The Poetics of Platonic Politics 
If, however, the practice of Socratic politics involves, as we have heard, 
speaking and thus acting in ways that are attuned to the concrete individual 
and directed toward justice and the best, we are now in a position to recog-
nize how Platonic writing performs a similar political practice with us. The 
text has been crafted in such a way that each of us is led to consider the 
health of our souls and the course of our own lives. The path of truth that 
runs  like  Ariadne’s  thread  through  the  Gorgias  has  led  us  to  this  recognition  
and stands as an example of the poetics of Platonic politics. It is Gorgias 
who  first  enunciates  “truth”  in  the  dialogue,  and  as  he  is  led  to  recognize  the  
political power endemic to the attempt to speak truth with an eye toward 
justice, we are made to feel the power of words to do political things. The 
loyalty   to  the  λόγος  Socrates  is  able  to  cultivate  in  Gorgias  appears  in  the  
discussion with Polus when the true difference between  a  τέχνη  and  an  ex-
perience is established, and we are made aware of a central difference be-
tween   them,   for   a   τέχνη   attends   always   “toward   the   best”   [πρὸς   τὸ 
βέλτιστον]. Plato has Socrates repeat this formulation—πρὸς   τὸ 
βέλτιστον—when he articulates the beautiful rhetoric, artful and good, that 
is able to move others by words to consider the health of their souls. That 
someone in the dialogue has been so moved, is evident when Gorgias 
speaks  up  to  save  the  λόγος  between  Socrates  and  Callicles  from  a  prema-
ture end. Gorgias’s words testify to the power of Socratic politics, for he 
admits:   “I  myself  want   [βούλομαι]   to   hear   you   go   through   the   things   re-
maining yourself.”75 The desire he expresses here is rooted in a concern for 
a   λόγος   articulated   toward the best and thus stands in tension with what 
might seem best for Gorgias, given his own interest in procuring students. 
Yet, by making these the last words Gorgias speaks in the dialogue, Plato 
invites us to consider how they empower Socrates to continue along a road 
that leads not only to the articulation of a practice of politics determined as 
the art of speaking the truth, but also ultimately to a myth that is said to be a 
_________  
74 Gorg. 504d6-8. 
75 Gorg. 506b2-3. 
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λόγος  precisely  because  it  is  spoken  as  true. Socrates  puts  it  this  way:  “Lis-
ten  to  a  quite  beautiful  λόγος,  as  they  say,  which  you  will  consider  a  myth,  
but  I,  indeed,  think  it  is  a  λόγος,  for  I  will  be  saying  the  things  I  am  about  to  
say   as   true.”76 The details of the story in which we are judged naked in 
body and soul, by naked judges who are able to see us for what we have 
done and thus for who we are, is indeed beautiful. But the truth of it lies in 
the way the story enjoins each of us who encounter it to consider the degree 
to which we ourselves are living a healthy life in body and soul, a life that 
Socrates describes at the end of the dialogue as an attempt. Of his life, of 
the practice of his philosophy, and so also of his attempt to do political 
things,  Socrates   says,   “I  will   try,   by  practicing   truth,   to   live  by  being   the  
best   I  can  possibly  be,  and,  when  I  die,   to  die   that  way   too.”77 Crafted by 
Plato, these words, like all the words in the dialogue, put truth into practice 
by attempting to speak toward the best, and seeking in so speaking to turn 
us, you and me, toward the question of justice as that erotic ideal that opens 
the possibility of true human political community. 
             PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
_________  
76 Gorg. 523a1-3. 
77 Gorg. 526d5-e1. 
  
COMMENTARY ON LONG 
NALIN RANASINGHE 
ABSTRACT 
Long  finds  that  Socrates’  sincere  commitment  to  dialogue  and  joint  seeking  af-
ter truth disarms his belligerent interlocutors, brings them under the authority 
of the logos, and gives self-knowledge along with a newfound sense of the 
common  good.  He  says  that  the  true  political  art  can  “look  into  the  soul,  under-
stand its condition  and  see  what’s  good  for  it.”  My  commentary  challenges  his  
assumption that Socrates and Gorgias become friends and suggests that the na-
ture  of   the  soul  dictates   that   this  political  art’s  effects  are  more  negative  than  
positive.  But  I  agree  with  Long’s  emphasis  on  the  non-adversarial nature of di-
alogic speech and urge him to elaborate on its ontological basis: a cosmos held 
together by partnership and friendship between gods and men. 
 
I will first praise Professor Long for his choice, and non-disingenuous read-
ing, of this dialogue. Despite being the third longest and perhaps the clear-
est of Plato’s  works,   the  Gorgias has long been neglected by many Plato 
scholars. Philosophers have often preferred the Republic to the Gorgias, 
perhaps because  we  don’t  like  to  be  preached at. As Epictetus would have 
observed, we prefer discussing the meaning of virtue or even studying the 
origins of the imperative to live virtuously to actually living virtuously.1 
This is why we prefer the grotesque caricature of Socrates as bumbling buf-
foon, kindly offered by Aristophanes in the Clouds, and avoid dealing with 
the stern prophet of the Gorgias. Indeed, consciously or not, many scholars 
like to use the Clouds as a kind of vaccination against the sternness of the 
Apology; following the advice of Gorgias himself, they would use the com-
edy of the Clouds to deflate the angry accusations of the Apology.  
Put differently, the Republic appeals to the mad-scientist and utopian 
dreamer that lurks within every absent-minded  professor.  We’re  much  hap-
pier discussing an outlandishly utopian work that seems to require the readi-
ly assessed traits of philological precision and technical cleverness. Perhaps 
we all believe that philosophy cannot help souls or cities to live virtuously? 
Regardless of whether this impotence is caused by original sin or consumer-
ism, most of its teachers believe that philosophy is a childish pursuit only 
good  for  getting  high  GRE’s  and  admission  to  law  school.  Callicles  would  
be proud of us! 
_________  
1 See Epictetus, Enchiridion chapter 52 in Discourses and Selected Writings, trans. Rob-
ert Dobbins (Penguin Classics, 2008), 244-45. 
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The Gorgias is important because it states positively what the Republic 
only indicated indirectly by the typical Platonic device of a reductio ad ab-
surdum. 2  Unlike the Republic, which describes a totalitarian regime so 
beautiful   to   the   ambitious   that   Socrates’   pedagogic   irony   is   ignored,   thus  
rendering him young and beautiful, Long sees that the Gorgias unmistaka-
bly defends the possibility of personal integrity and virtuous political art: 
the basis of a moral soul and a just city. This makes Socrates more erotic to 
the soul and uglier to the body and mind to the extent that he makes stern 
moral demands of us.  
Professor Long claims that the practice of Socratic philosophy has great 
transformative power. This   is   shown   by   the   “burst   of   thumotic   energy”  
evoked   by  Socrates’   erotic   art   that   forces  Callicles   to   reveal   his   nihilistic 
world-view to Gorgias—his intellectual grandfather. Professor Long dis-
covers this insight into Callicles’  worldview  at   the  very  center  of  our  dia-
logue.  We   find   that  Callicles   too,   like  many  of  Socrates’  victims  or   inter-
locutors, is numbered among the prophets; he is involuntarily compelled by 
the art of Socrates to see and proclaim that his life follows a course directly 
contrary to that pursued by Socratic political philosophy. Further, Long 
suggests  that  Callicles’  outburst  is  prompted  by  Socrates’  assertion  that  “an  
unjust deed must not be hidden but instead brought into the open so as to be 
punished   and   made   healthy”   (480c).   Contrary   to   the   maxims of esoteric 
political thought and  expensive  sophistic  education,  Socrates’  maieutic  art  
succeeds  in  revealing  the  nihilistic  view  of  reality  ruling  Callicles’  soul.  As  
Gorgias advised, this tragic impulse must be exposed to comic ridicule and 
shame so it may self-destruct. Socrates had hitherto done this privately 
“whispering   in   corners”   (485e),   now   Callicles   himself   demands   that   his  
punishment take place in public. 
And   so  Callicles’  moment   of   self-clarity precedes his justly or unjustly 
frequently anthologized speech where he threatens Socrates with bodily 
violence after denouncing Socratic philosophy for being ridiculous and un-
manly (485a-d). Before doing so, he was unsettled enough to observe that if 
Socrates is correct, life as it is currently lived would be turned upside down 
(481c).  In  other  words,  Callicles’  speech  and  deeds  are  quite  consistent; his 
angry words are uttered in defense of a view of reality itself as chaotic, 
ruled by violence and defended   by   thumotic   love   of   one’s   own;;   his   con-
sciousness is as strife ridden as the external reality he inhabits. In his eyes 
the Peloponnesian War has revealed that the gods are dead or non-existent, 
_________  
2 See Ranasinghe, The Soul of Socrates (Cornell University Press, 2000) 1-27. 
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and that evil goes unpunished.3 In such a reality glory and pleasure are 
fleeting; the only pure happiness is gained by acts of destruction and self-
destruction.  This  is  the  ‘cash  value’  of  the  victory-driven life. 
In   this   seeming   chaos,   Gorgias’   notorious   tripartite   account   of   Nature  
holds: nothing exists; and if it anything exists it is unknowable; and if it 
exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be indicated to others.4 As this chaos is 
either god-forsaken,  or  entirely  materialistic,  man’s  natural  need  for  mean-
ing is catered to by myth-making rhetoricians. This is why Gorgias says that 
his art brings freedom to its user as well as rule over his city (452d). So that 
sheep may safely graze, and artisans may go about their daily business un-
impeded, this artificial political theology is guarded by angry warriors. This 
tripartite  structure  has  more  than  a  passing  resemblance  to  Plato’s  Republic; 
Gorgias’   agnosticism   seems   to  make   him   a   Socratic   doppelgänger! Once 
again, the Gorgias and Republic seem to provide sharply differing takes on 
reality. 
If Callicles has correctly described reality, then the Socrates of the Gor-
gias is either a demagogic knave or an even greater fool in the cave of the 
Republic. In any case we surely do not seem to take his words seriously 
today.  Socrates’  belief  in  the  possibility  of  a  cosmic  order sustaining a tem-
perate life has been rejected both by religious right and the scientific left: 
the right condemning him for his Pelagian optimism/ignorance of original 
sin, for else Christ died in vain, and the left ridiculing his antiquated belief 
in such things as virtue, the soul, and the cosmos. For better or worse we 
too live in a world dominated by religious strife and technological violence. 
Man  can  either  humbly  submit  to  God’s  inscrutable  plan  or  enslave  reason  
to serve his own insatiable passions. Likewise Callicles—whose name 
means  ‘called  beautiful’  or  ‘he  called me  beautiful  all  night  long’—greatly 
resembles a typical disenchanted youth who has been pandered or marketed 
to from infancy; born and bred in conditions of strife nothing else is known 
to him beyond its violent necessity. His sense of what is real is warped by 
the endless pursuit of pleasure and power. Thus victory matters more to him 
than   truth   since   the   latter   doesn’t   exist   independently   of   power   relations;;  
likewise, self-forgetting pleasure replaces the belief in long-term happiness 
or a good life. This stance alienates him from self-knowledge and any sense 
of abiding reality. He is incorrigibly ignorant. Surely he cannot share in a 
sincere conversation with Socrates about what is best?  Isn’t  Socrates  simply  
_________  
3 See Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 3.82-84. This is why Thucydides calls the Pelo-
ponnesian  War   the   “greatest   movement   yet   known   in   history”;;   it   overthrew   the   previous,  
Homeric, dispensation of a world order ruled by anthropomorphic gods. 
4 Pseudo-Aristotle, Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias, 979a10. 
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shaming Gorgias by showing this itinerant drug dealer the long-term results 
of his wares? 
Beyond forcing us to ponder the extent to which we can be led to mutilate 
the windows of our soul, and visually imprison ourselves in a Hellish un-
derworld of our own making, Professor Long also challenges us to rethink 
our view of the power of Socratic medicine. The Socratic political art, as he 
describes it, is as relevant to our time as it was to the terrible years after the 
Peloponnesian War. He claims that dialogic speech, directed towards truth 
rather than victory, and the good of all as opposed to adversarial agon, per-
suades us to recognize the authority of truth and the reality of the common 
good.  Long  suggests  that  Socrates’  sincere  commitment to dialogue and the 
joint seeking after truth disarms his otherwise belligerent interlocutors, 
brings them under the authority of the logos, and gives them self-
knowledge along with a newfound sense of the common good. Even as two 
of them denounced Socrates’  use  of  shame  to  make  his  point,  all  three  of  his  
interlocutors were made to testify against rhetoric under the influence of 
this logos. I am curious about what Professor Long can say about the origin 
of this revelatory power. I certainly applaud his emphasis on joint essaying 
—epicheirein—rather than creation. 
Clearly  this  concern  for   the  ‘common  good’  or  ‘what   is  best’   is  marked  
by the spirit of honest inquiry and sincerity guiding all parties amidst uncer-
tainty and contingency, rather than a victory-driven desire of a self-
professed expert to implement his agenda. This suggests that this common 
good is as least as much a spirit or disposition as it is a definite result or 
product. Since Socrates has the utmost contempt for statesmen who built 
many magnificent edifices, whitened sepulchers, whilst corrupting the body 
politic  (519a)  we  can  conclude  that  this  ‘true  political  art’  is  based  on  indi-
vidual integrity and public friendship. But can these qualities be nurtured in 
a way that refutes Mark Antony’s  insight   that  while  “the  evil   that  men  do  
lives  after  them,  the  good  is  oft  interred  with  their  bones”?5 Can we go be-
yond refuting ignorance and exposing vice? What does the true political art 
create? Should we not beware of trying to fashion souls, cities, or images of 
the cosmos as if they could ever be finished objects or products of our art? 
Doesn’t  their  reality  belong  more  to  the  realm  of  epicheirein and Aletheia?  
In other words, inquiring before and beyond this spirit of honesty and 
public spiritedness we surely cannot avoid questions concerning human 
nature and the ultimate character of reality itself. As Long subtly implies, 
Socrates suggests that our preoccupation with strife and adversarial interac-
tion is blameworthy and deleterious because  it  both  stifles  the  soul’s  capaci-
_________  
5 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, III. ii 72-73. 
COMMENTARY ON LONG 
 
179 
ty for temperance and diminishes its ability to interact with a subtly benevo-
lent cosmos. This conviction  also  surely  sustains  Socrates’  belief   in  a  true  
art of rehabilitative justice for the diseased soul that complements the true 
political art and its positive celebration of a good life. Yet it seems that the 
Gorgias itself, like any other Socratic text, functions more at the level of 
justice than politics. In other words, we almost invariably see Socrates en-
gaged in the task of punishing and healing ignorance, stripping away false 
knowledge and adversarial attitudes; we do not see him engaged in the 
characteristic political task of deliberating about what is good for the city in 
the company of other similarly disposed virtuous citizens. Surely this sug-
gests   that   the   true   political   art   is   negative   rather   than   positive?   Socrates’  
daimon, however we view it, also serves in a like capacity—only warning 
us of our limits and of what must not be ventured, rather than inspiring us to 
do positive deeds. How much positive transformative power does this polit-
ical art have? Is there good rhetoric? Is it irresistibly transformative?  
My  qualified  skepticism  here  also  extends  to  Professor  Long’s  claim  that  
Socrates and Gorgias have become friends; my take on the matter is that 
their objective enmity will persist unless Gorgias renounces his trade. Phy-
sicians and drug-dealers cannot be friends. While there are many Platonic 
political philosophers who favor an alliance between Socrates and Gorgias, 
these parties also reject notions of the common good and hold that noble 
lies   and   political   theologies   are   all   part   of   a   philosopher’s   stock   in   trade.  
These gentlemen are generally very suspicious of Socrates and tend to read 
him on horseback whilst facing the East. Surely Long does not share their 
esoteric views? It is more likely that Socrates punishes Gorgias by forcing 
him to gaze on the diseased souls of his students and victims. Long remind-
ed  us  of  Aristotle’s  words,  “it   is  not  possible  or  easy to change by words 
things  that  from  long  ago  have  taken  hold  in  people’s  character”  (EN X 9, 
1197b). Perhaps the political art can do little more than force us to observe 
the causes and effects of our corruption. How this knowledge is used is ul-
timately  up  to  the  patient’s  will.  The  souls’  transformative powers can lead 
it to see white as black or vice versa. 
Let us now pay further attention to the question of the soul. While I agree 
fully with his treating the soul as the basic building block of Socratic phi-
losophy, Professor Long claims that the political art is able to look into the 
soul,  understand  its  condition,  and  even  see  what’s  best  for  it.  Although  we  
see how the power of the logos makes it often possible for Socrates to make 
a soul reveal its disease—disguised as wisdom—and perhaps even disgorge 
it, it is surely much harder to see the soul of another—or even to make him 
see  his  own  soul.  By  the  time  a  soul’s  interior  is  writ  large  on  a  face  or  life,  
it is all but irreversible: one is either a saint or a monster. Does Long be-
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lieve that any practitioner  of  this  art  can  look  into  any  soul  and  tell  what’s  
good for it?  
My  own  view  is  that  Socrates  is  well  aware  of  the  soul’s  terrible  powers  
of autonomy and inviolability. This is why he relies on myth and indirect 
suggestion. Again, a misplaced emphasis on verbal victory can occur at the 
cost of true learning, which always requires humility on the part of the 
teacher/midwife along with the co-operation of the student, and often oc-
curs in retrospect. The Platonic texts seem to suggest that even the gods 
cannot violate the freedom of the will. This is why Socrates says that even 
gods and men are held together by friendship in a cosmos of geometric 
equality and right proportion (508a). Professor Long certainly agrees with 
me to the extent that he speaks of the law and ordered arrangement of the 
soul by which it becomes healthy, but  I  wonder  if  he  agrees  with  Socrates’  
statement about the cosmos? In other words, what sort of ultimate reality 
does this true political art presuppose and uncover? Are we, as philoso-
phers, obliged to deny the possibility of any overarching wisdom—however 
subtle—and blindly assert that human life, and indeed all reality, are as 
Hobbes described them? 
I will conclude by claiming that a fine and enduring image of true politi-
cal art is found in the myth at the end of the Gorgias—though  it’s  strangely  
called a true logos by Socrates (523a). Here we see a reversal of Hades: 
instead  of   the  dead  having  ‘no-idea’  of   their   former   life,   for   the first time 
the irreversible damage that evil has inflicted on their souls is visible to all. 
This damage or self-mutilation is its own penalty. They simply must live 
with full self-knowledge. This is quite consistent with the infinite labors of 
the literally dis-eased souls in Homeric Tartarus. Since Socrates, who prid-
ed himself on his ignorance of things under the earth, says this is a true ac-
count, he seems to be describing his this-worldly activity of revealing to the 
living the damage that that they have inflicted on themselves while there is 
still time for rehabilitation. At the very least others, ourselves included, may 
profit   from   these   ‘rare   examples’   of   the   eternal   law:   evil   carries   its   own  
penalty.  We’re not cosmic orphans left to our own vices or technical devic-
es by uncaring gods. All is not permitted.  
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